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PRECONCEPTION TORT AS A BASIS FOR RECOVERY
.4bala v. City of New York, 78 A.D.2d 389, 434 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1981)
In A/bala v. City of New York,' the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, realizing the novelty of preconception torts2 as a
basis for a cause of action, refused to extend such an unprecedented
right to an infant plaintiff.'
Appellant, an infant plaintiff, brought a negligence suit against the
City of New York4 for injuries allegedly resulting from a perforation of
his mother's uterus during an abortion procedure at a city hospital5
almost four years prior to his conception.' The Supreme Court, New
York County, entered summary judgment against the infant plaintiff
1. 78 A.D.2d 389, 434 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1981).
2. A preconception tort refers to tortious conduct occurring prior to the plaintiff's concep-
tion and resulting in injuries to the plaintiff. Eg., Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir.
1978); Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1976). See notes 66-74
infra and accompanying text. A prenatal tort, on the other hand, involves a tortious act commit-
ted subsequent to the plaintiffs conception. E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E.
638 (1900) (infant plaintiff was born crippled because his mother, while still pregnant with plain-
tiff, was thrown to the floor of an elevator in which she was riding), overruled, Amann v. Faidy,
415 111. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884)
(infant plaintiff was miscarried and subsequently died because its mother tripped on a negligently
maintained highway). See generally Note, Torts Prior to Conception: 4 New Theory of Liabiity,
56 NEB. L. REv. 706 (1977); Comment, Preconception Torts: .4 Look at Our Newest Class ofLiti-
gants, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 97 (1978); Note, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived,
48 U. COLO. L. REV. 621 (1977); 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 891 (1978).
3. 78 A.D.2d at 390-93, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 401-03.
4. Appellant brought suit through his father in accordance with New York civil practice law
concerning representation of infants, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1201 (McKinney 1976), which reads
in part: "[Ain infant shall appear by the guardian of his property or, if there is no such guardian,
by a parent having legal custody .... "
Appellant contended that he suffered brain damage as a result of his mother's perforated uterus.
78 A.D.2d at 390, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 401. The original complaint alleged five causes of action. The
first two asserted that appellant was injured as a result of medical malpractice and the negligent
treatment of his mother. The third alleged that appellant's mother, unaware of the risks of an
abortion, did not give informed consent to the consequential injury to appellant. The fourth and
fifth causes of action were on behalf of each parent for loss of appellant's companionship and
services and for present and future medical expenses.
5. Appellant's mother underwent an abortion in December 1971. In June 1973 she filed a
malpractice suit against the performing physician, and the suit was settled in June 1979 for
$175,000. TheAlbala court held that the causes of action set forth on behalf of appellant's parents
were encompassed in the settlement of the prior malpractice suit. Id at 393, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
6. Appellant was born June 3, 1976, indicating his conception occurred near September
1975, approximately three years, nine months after the abortion. Id at 390, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
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for failure to state a valid cause of action.7 On appeal, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed and held: A tort commit-
ted against the mother of an unconceived child that results in injury to
the child during gestation does not give the child a cause of action.
Actionable negligence consists of three elements:9 a dutyt0 to ob-
serve some standard of care," a breach of that duty, and an injury
suffered as a consequence of the breach.'2 Within the framework of
7. Id at 393, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
8. id at 393, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
10. See National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 202 (1879). A duty in negligence cases
may be defined as "an obligation to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a
particular standard of conduct towards another." W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 53, at 324. Typi-
cally, courts have tried to define the scope of duty in terms of foreseeability, see Kahn v. James
Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 6147622, 126 N.E.2d 836, 840 (1955) (every person owes a duty to all others to
exercise ordinary care to guard against injury naturally flowing as a foreseeable consequence), but
as yet "no universal test ... has been formulated." W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 53, at 325. Two
competing lines of thought have developed. The first limits the range of liability to those persons,
known or unknown, likely to be affected by the negligent act. Seavey, Book Review, 45 HARV. L.
REv. 209, 210 (1931). See Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 376, 308 N.E.2d 617, 619 (1974);
Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REv. 72, 75-85 (1942). The opposing view suggests that a
negligent party owes a duty to all those injured as a proximate result of the negligent act, regard-
less of the likelihood of the injury. Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 361
11. 95, 103, 197 N.E. 578, 582 (1935); Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn. 94,
97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896); Dodge v. McArthur, 126 Vt. 81, 83, 223 A.2d 453, 454 (1966). See
generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014 (1928). In the
second approach, the duty concept is left as "a shortened statement of a conclusion. . . [that] the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 53, at 325-26.
11. Generally, every person is expected to exercise the prudence of an ordinary, reasonable
person. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 32, at 149-66. When the individual is a physician or medical
expert, both a minimum standard of professional competence and the exercise of a standard of
care reflecting that competence are required. Id § 32, at 161. See, e.g., McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.
Supp. 394, 399 (M.D. Pa. 1947) (a physician must exercise the skill generally used by physicians
and surgeons of ordinary skill and learning in the practice of the profession). See generally Me-
Coid, The Care Required ofMedical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1959).
12. Generally, courts hold that the defendant's actions must proximately cause the plaintiff's
injuries. This relationship is often expressed in the terms that "but for" the defendant's act, plain-
titrs injury would not have occurred. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, §§ 41-42. See, e.g., Daly v.
Illinois Central R.R., 248 Iowa 758, 761, 80 N.W.2d 335, 337 (1957) (proximate cause is the pre-
dominating cause without which the injury would not have occurred); Hughes v. Children's
Clinic, P.A., 269 S.C. 389, 398, 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977) (act may be deemed the proximate
cause only when without such negligence the injury would not have occurred). Duty and causa-
tion are distinct entities. The former is a question of law to be determined by the court, and the.
latter is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 37, at 205-06.
It is an important distinction, for any attempt to impose a duty on the basis of causation would
result in infinite responsibility. Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 24 (1953).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/11
PRECONCEPTION TORT
these elements, delineating the scope of duty has perplexed the courts.' 3
Historically, one had a cause of action for negligence only when there
was a breach of some duty owed to him. 14 This forced the injured
party to characterize himself within the class of people to whom the
wrongdoer owed a duty.
The theory of preconception torts developed out of the law of negli-
gence' 5 and the common law maxim ubijus, ibiremedium.'6 As the law
of personal injuries to unborn children developed, courts hesitated to
expand the class of unborn children beyond those with a separate,
physically recognizable existence at the time of the negligent act;' 7 the
law refused to recognize "negligence in the air, so to speak." I s This
sentiment was reflected in the early cases 19 that dealt with injuries sus-
tained by infants while en ventre sa mi're.20
In 1884 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Dietrich v. Inhabit-
ants of Northampton,2' became the first court to address the issue of
recovery for prenatal injuries. In Dietrich the mother suffered a miscar-
riage of the infant plaintiff when she tripped on a negligently main-
tained highway. Justice Holmes, writing for the court, denied any
cause of action for injuries sustained by the child before birth.22 The
13. See note 10 supra. This consternation is especially evident in the area of prenatal inju-
nes. See notes 21-56 infra and accompanying text.
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 53, at 324. The Supreme Court in National Say. Bank v.
Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879), noted the necessity of the duty restriction "to restrain the remedy from
being pushed to an impracticable extreme." Id at 202.
15. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 11. App. 2d 240, 249-53, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853-55 (1963), cert.
denied. 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
16. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Eg., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417,
440, 79 A.2d 550, 560 (1951); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1233, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (1953).
See Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 635, 165 N.E.2d 912, 914 (1960) (injuries
inflicted on unborn child a manifest wrong that could not go without redress); Tobin v. Grossman,
24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969) (ideally every injury
should have a remedy); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34, 36 (1961) (it is fundamental that one may seek redress for every substantial wrong); Williams
v Marian Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 124, 87 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1949) (it is elementary
that if a wrong is committed there should be a remedy).
17. See notes 21-38 infra and accompanying text.
18. F. POLLOCK, LAW OF ToRTs 468 (13th ed. 1929). For a court to find liability, the law
required that some relationship exist between the plaintiff and defendant. This relationship is
encompassed in the concept of duty. See notes 10 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 21-38 infra and accompanying text. See generally Comment, Negligence and
he Unborn Child- .4 Time/or Change, 18 S.D.L. REV. 204 (1973).
20. In its mother's womb. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (5th ed. 1979).
21. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
22. Id at 17.
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court reasoned that the child as a fetus was not separable from its
mother and therefore, apart from its mother, was owed no duty of
care.13 Only the mother, to whom a duty was owed, could recover
damages for personal injuries resulting from the defendant's negli-
gence.24 The court held that the infant had to be biologically separable
from its mother at the time of injury in order to have a cause of action.
This remained precedent until 1946, but not without criticism. 25
23. Id Accord, Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 224, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (1921) (defendant
owes no duty to an unborn child apart from the duty owed to the mother), overruled, Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1953); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124
Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W.2d 944, 950 (1935) (defendant owes no duty to unborn child apart from the
duty to avoid injuring the mother), overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d
820 (Tex. 1967); Walker v. Great Northern Ry. of Ire., 28 L.R. Ir. 69, 88 (1891) (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (no legal duty is owed to that which is not in esse in fact).
The first Restatement of Torts, 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 869 (1939), reflected this belief as
well:
A person who negligently causes harm to an unborn child is not liable to such child
for the harm.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is applicable only to unintended harms to the
mother or to the child. It prevents recovery by the child after its birth for any of the
consequences of negligent conduct before birth. On the other hand, in an action by the
mother for a tort which has caused her physical harm, damages can be included for the
pain, suffering and mental distress caused by the death of the child before birth or imme-
diately afterwards.
A person designated by statute to maintain an action for causing death can not main-
tain an action for a negligent act committed before the birth of a child which causes the
death of the child either before or after birth.
24. 138 Mass. at 17. Holmes did raise the philosophic possibility of "a conditional prospec-
tive liability in tort to one not yet in being," id at 16, but dismissed it for lack of practicability and
precedent, id at 16-17. Later courts, however, attached great importance to it. See note 51 bnfra
and accompanying text.
25. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (County Ct. 1924) (allowed recovery for prenatal
injuries on the basis that there was no logical reason for denying compensation to one injured by
the commission of a wrong where causation could be established) (effectively overruled by Berlin
v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940)). Also recognizing recovery were Scott v.
McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (based on statute), ajj'dper
curlam, 33 Cal. App. 2d 640, 93 P.2d 562 (1939); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923)
(based on statute); and Montreal Tramways v. LaVeille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337 (Can.) (based on civil
law).
Courts questioned the inconsistency of recognizing a fetus as in esse for the purposes of property
law, see, e.g., Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 468, 26 A.2d 684, 688 (1942) (Brogan, J., dissent-
ing); In re Holthausen's Will, 175 Misc. 1022, 1024, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (1941); see generally 4 H.
TiFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 112, at 391 (3d ed. 1939), while treating it as a "nonen-
tity" in tort recovery actions. Often cited in this controversy is Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves.
227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798), in which Justice Buller said:
Let us see what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in recovery, though it is for
the purpose of making him answer over in value. He may be an executor. He may take
under the Statute of Distributions. . . . He may take by devise. He may be entitled
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/11
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Among the early dissenters from the Dietrich rationale, Justice Boggs
of the Illinois Supreme Court proved most influential. In Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital,26 the first case involving a surviving infant plaintiff,27
the majority followed Dietrich and denied recovery because the child
sustained the injuries while still a part of his mother.28 Justice Boggs
criticized the majority for "sacrificing truth to a mere theoretical ab-
straction" 29 in its refusal to recognize that the child as a viable fetus
suffered injuries distinct from those of the mother.3 0 Clearly, he ar-
gued, a fetus capable of independent survival was equally capable of
sustaining an independent tort with a separate cause of action. 31
Despite Justice Boggs' separability argument, an uncompromising
majority of courts followed the Dietrich rationale 2 for fear of the con-
under a charge for raising portions. He may have an injunction; and he may have a
guardian.
id at 322,31 Eng. Rep. at 163. See generally Note, The Law andthe Unborn Child- The Legaland
Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349 (1971); Comment, supra note 19. See also I
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
26. 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900), overruled, Amann v. Faidy, 415 IM. 422, 114
N.E.2d 412 (1953).
27. Allaire was the first American case involving a surviving infant plaintiff. Walker v. Great
Northern Ry. of Ire., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (1891), an Irish case decided nine years earlier, also involved a
surviving infant plaintiff.
28. 184 Ill. at 365-68, 56 N.E. at 639-40. The court made no distinction of the fact that the
mother in this case was ten days from delivery when the negligent act, causing her to miscarry the
plaintiff, occurred.
29. Id at 370, 56 N.E. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
30. Justice Boggs stated:
The law should, it seems to me, be that whenever a child in utero is so far advanced in
prenatal age as that, should parturition by natural or artificial means occur at such age,
such child could and would live separable from the mother, and grow into the ordinary
activities of life, and is afterwards born, and becomes a living human being, such child
has a right of action for any injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his or her
person at such age of viability, though then in the womb of the mother.
Id at 374, 56 N.E. at 642 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
31. Id (Boggs, J., dissenting).
32. E.g., Buel v. United Rys., 248 Mo. 126, 131-32, 154 S.W. 71, 72 (1913) (statute requiring a
railroad company to pay a fine for any person dying from an injury resulting from the railway's
negligence did not apply to an unborn child), overruled, Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258
S.W.2d 577 (1953); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 223, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (1921) (holding that
injuries inflicted were to the mother and as such only she had a cause of action), overruled, Woods
v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 175, 49 A. 704,
707 (1901) (holding that a child could not maintain an action for injuries sustained while in the
womb, for at the time of injury the mother and child were one), overruled, Sylvia v. Gobielle, 101
R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78
S.W.2d 944, 950 (1935) (holding that, tested by the knowledge and experience of the ordinary
prudent man, defendant owed no duty to an unborn child), overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand &
Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967); Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis.
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sequences that might follow such a divergence. In Walker v. Great
Northern Railway," Justice O'Brien, concurring, emphasized the diffi-
culty in proving that a negligent act committed prior to a child's birth
was the proximate cause of the infant's injuries.34 This impediment
would undoubtedly lead to a proliferation of fictitious claims 5 and
leave juries in the untenable position of having to decide on the basis of
mere conjecture whether a defendant's actions were responsible for an
infant's prenatal injuries.36 Furthermore, critics argued, no common-
272,276, 159 N.W. 916,917 (1916) (holding that because a fetus does not have a separate existence
at the time of the injury, no separate rights can accrue to it).
33. 28 L.R. Ir. 69.
34. "inhere are instances in the law where rules of right are founded upon the inherent and
inevitable difficulty or impossibility of proof. And it is easy to see what a boundless sea of specu-
lation in evidence this new idea would launch us." Id at 81 (O'Brien, J., concurring). Accord,
Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926), overruled, Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala.
327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 111. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), overruled,
Amann v. Faidy, 415 11. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,
124 Tex. 347,78 S.W.2d 944 (1935), overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d
820 (Tex. 1967); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), overruled
on other grounds, In re Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980). See Taylor,
Zatragenic Injury Compensation, 17 MED. ScI. & L. 25 (1977) ("[i]n the complexity of modem
medicine it is not always possible to ascribe a result to a single cause"). But see Scott v. McPhee-
ters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 637, 92 P.2d 678, 682 (1939) (difficulty of obtaining proof should prompt
greater leniency in affording a remedy rather than a denial of plain justice); Smith v. Brennan, 31
N.J. 353, 365, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960) (difficulties of proof are not peculiar to the area of prenatal
torts, and the mere difficulty of proving a fact is not a good reason for blocking all attempts to
prove it); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951) (it is an inadmissible
concept that uncertainty of proof can ever destroy a legal right; the questions of causation are no
different in kind from ones arising in thousands of other negligence cases); Steggall v. Morris, 363
Mo. 1224, 1231, 258 S.W.2d 577, 580 (1953) (if a plaintiff cannot prove his case no judgment will
be permitted to stand; certainly courts will not refuse to entertain suits for redress of wrongs
because a plaintiff would have difficulty proving his case); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59
Wash. 2d 288, 292, 367 P.2d 835, 837-39 (1962) (difficult causation issues are no reason to deny the
sufficiency of a pleading; difficulty of proof does not prevent the assertion of a legal right).
35. See, eg., Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W.2d 944,
950 (1935), overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967). But see
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 437, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (195 1) (the argument that fraudulent
claims will overwhelm the courts should have no weight to prevent legitimate claims from being
heard, faked contentions present no novel question to judicial bodies); Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 615-16, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558-59 (1969) (discussing psychologi-
cal injuries, the court noted that fraud, extra litigation, and a measure of speculation are possibili-
ties, but those are not reasons for a court to deny a logical legal right); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto.
Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 355, 99 N.W.2d 163, 170 (1959) (court noted that fraudulent claims are not
unknown to the law and that adequate safeguards against such claims can be devised), overruled
on other grounds, In re Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980).
36. See Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Drobner v. Peters,
232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), overruled, Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/11
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law precedent recognized a cause of action for injuries sustained in
utero.37 The power to create such a cause of action lay within the prov-
ince of the legislature, not the judiciary.a
In 1946 Bonbrest v. Kotz3 9 initiated the most "abrupt reversal of a
well settled rule" in the history of torts.40 The court reasoned that if the
tortious conduct occurred subsequent to the unborn infant's viability,41
a separate judicial being existed and possessed a common-law right of
recovery 42 for any injuries it sustained. Such recovery was predicated
(1951); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347,78 S.W.2d 944 (1935), overruled,
Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967).
37. Eg., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Newman v. City of
Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937), overruled, Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187
N.W.2d 218 (1971); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), overruled, Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960)
(Bell, J., dissenting). But see note 42 infra.
38. Justice O'Brien, concurring, aptly stated this in Walker v. Great Northern Ry. of Ire., 28
L.R. Ir. 69 (1891):
The law is in some respects a stream that gathers accretions with time from new relations
and conditions. But it is also a landmark that forbids advance on defined rights and
engagements; and if these are to be altered, if new rights and engagements are to be
created, that is the province of legislation and not of decision.
Id at 82 (O'Brien, J., concurring). See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951)
(Lewis, J., dissenting); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), overruled, Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960)
(Bell, J., dissenting); Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940). But see note
56 infra.
39. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
40. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 55, at 336.
41. Viability is defined as: "That stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child
may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1404 (5th ed. 1979). See generally 51 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 227 (1974)
(discussing medical aspects involved in proving fetal viability).
42. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946). The court believed the law should
recognize medical science's teaching that the fetus is separate from the mother, id at 141 n.14, and
grant it the same rights in the law of negligence as it was granted in the law of property and crime,
id at 140.
In reaching its conclusion, the court dismissed the lack of precedent argument on the ground
that "the common law is not an arid and sterile thing, and it is anything but static and inert....
fT]he common law has been and is sufficiently elastic to meet changing conditions." Id at 142.
Other courts dealing with the prenatal injury issue have reiterated this belief. Eg., Amann v.
Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 433, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418 (1953) (the common laws most outstanding charac-
teristic is its adaptability and capacity for growth); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1230, 258
SW.2d 577, 579 (1953) (if inability to find any precedent at common law were a good reason to
deny an injured person a remedy, the common law would never have reached the embryo stage);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 NJ. 353, 362, 157 A.2d 497, 501 (1960) (the law of negligence is primarily
common law the great virtue of which is its adaptability to the conditions and needs of changing
times); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951) (when traditional corn-
Washington University Open Scholarship
282 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:275
on the child being born alive.4 3 Many jurisdictions thereafter invoked
Bonbrest's "viability standard" as the sole determinant in deciding
whether a child had a cause of action for prenatal injuries." Soon,
however, courts began to recognize the medical uncertainty of deter-
mining exactly when viability occurs45 and began to disregard viability
as an arbitrary and unjust test for deciding a defendant's liability.46
Expanding the scope of Bonbrest and its progeny, which limited re-
covery to injuries incurred by viable fetuses, the court in Kely v. Greg-
ory 47 recognized an infant's right of recovery for injuries caused before
the infant became viable. In Kely a negligently driven automobile
struck the infant plaintiffs mother, who was in her first trimester of
pregnancy, and allegedly caused the child to be born seriously handi-
capped. Characterizing viability as merely a condition under which
life would continue,48 the court argued that "legal separability" should
mon-law rules of negligence result in injustice, it is the duty of the court to bring the law into
accordance with present day standards of wisdom and justice).
It should be noted that the court in Bonbrest distinguished Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northamp-
ton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), on two grounds: that the plaintiff in that case was not viable at the time
of injury and that the injury had been transmitted organically through the mother. In the case at
bar the fetus had been directly injured through medical malpractice on its removal from the
womb. 65 F. Supp. at 140.
43. 65 F. Supp. at 142. Although tangential to the topic of this Comment, it is interesting to
note that as the viability requirement has eroded, see notes 47-56 infra and accompanying text, the
requirement that the plaintiff be born alive has come under attack. See, e.g., Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248
N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liabliy,
supra note 2, at 708 n. 11.
44. E.g., Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Keyes v. Construction Serv.,
Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577
(1953); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
45. Viability is an imprecise measure, especially as the refinements of pediatric care make it
possible for smaller and smaller infants to survive. See generally Note, The Impact of Medical
Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554 (1962).
46. See notes 47-56 infra and accompanying text. Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of
Tort Liabilityfor Injury to the Unborm Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life,
1978 DUKE LJ. 1401, 1416, argues that
[s]ince essentially all of the vital organs take form at a very early stage of fetal life, the
most serious postnatal difficulties result from injuries occurring in the first trimester of
pregnancy-long before viability. From a medical point of view, therefore, it makes
little sense to condition recovery on the viability of the fetus at the time of the injury.
Dean Prosser argues that all logic is in favor of ignoring the stage at which the injury occurs. W.
PROSSER, supra note 9, § 55, at 337.
47. 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) (extending Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102
N.E.2d 691 (1951), which limited recovery to children injured when viable).
48. The court reasoned:
We know something more of the actual process of conception and foetal development
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commence with "biological separability," which begins at conception.49
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted this theory in Puhl v. Milwau-
kee Automobile Insurance Co.5° and explained that although a fetus
was not a legal person in the full sense, it was a separate entity with a
potential personality. Prenatal injuries suffered by such a being im-
posed a conditional liability" on the tortfeasor. As the fetus developed
biologically from potentiality to reality, so did the wrong, which be-
came complete at birth. 2
In Smith v. Brennan53 the New Jersey Supreme Court expanded
Kelly's "biological separability" rationale. Recalling the principle
"that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and
body,"54 the Smith court held that an infant plaintiff could recover for
now than when some of the common law cases were decided; and what we know makes
it possible to demonstrate clearly that separability begins at conception. The mother's
biological contribution from conception on is nourishment and protection; but the foetus
has become a separate organism and remains so throughout its life.
282 A.D. at 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
49. The court noted that in the law of property, the distinction between viability and
nonviability was immaterial as to the time of vestiture, id at 545, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 698, and im-
plied that there should not be such a distinction in the law of negligence. See note 25 supra.
50. 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), overruled on other grounds, In re Estate of
Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980).
51. Conditional liability was a term first used by Justice Holmes. See note 24 supra. Numer-
ous courts now use it to indicate a liability to a class yet unconceived, with liability becoming fixed
upon conception or birth. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
52. Judge Hallows explained the biological-separability theory as follows:
Under this theory an unborn infant is not treated as a legal person but as a separate
entity or human being in the biological sense from conception having a potentiality of
personality which is not realized until birth. Injuries suffered before birth impose a con-
ditional liability on the tortfeasor. This liability becomes unconditional, or complete,
upon the birth of the injured separate entity as a legal person. If such personality is not
achieved, there would be no liabilty because of no damage to a legal person.
8 Wis. 2d at 356, 99 N.W.2d at 170. See Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504,
505, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1956); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1231, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (1953);
Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 485, 147 A.2d 108, 109-10 (1958). See generally White, The
Right ofRecoveryfor PrenatalInjuries, 12 LA. L. REv. 38 (1952); 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 684 (1958).
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, there appears to be a fundamental inconsistency
m the law relating to the rights of the unborn. On the one hand, the fetus is protected against the
tortfeasor from wrongful conduct, while on the other, the mother is allowed to abort. See Kader,
The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639 (1980).
53. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
54. Id at 359, 157 A.2d at 503. Accord, Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d
237 (10th Cir. 1973); Amann v. Faidy, 415 11M. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Keyes v. Construction
Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187
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negligently inflicted injuries regardless of whether it had a separate bio-
logical-legal identity when the tortious act was committed." The tim-
hag of the tortious conduct affected neither the extent of the child's
injuries nor the desirability of the defendant's conduct.5 6
If a fetus need not have a separate legal identity at the time of the
tortious act,57 logic allows an infant plaintiff to sue for injuries resulting
from an act committed prior to conception.58 One court has rejected
this view, but most have accepted it.5 9
N.W.2d 218 (1971); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478,248 N.E.2d 901,301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969);
Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966). See Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New
Theory ofLiability, supra note 2:
The infants in these cases have been injured severely. Public policy demands that
those responsible for such injuries bear the burden of compensating these infants for the
damages with which they have been born. . . . The concept of the right of every child
to be physically, mentally and emotionally 'well born' is fundamental to human dignity.
Id at 722 (footnotes omitted). Contra, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
55. 31 NJ. at 359, 157 A.2d at 503. Accord, Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93,
96 (1960) (viability at the time of injury has little to do with the basic right to recover, the primary
question being one of causation); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 79, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (1966)
(causation, not viability, is the test).
56. See Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, 230 (County Ct. 1924). The emphasis was no
longer on the defendant's rights but on the plaintiffs. One has no right to hide behind the law
when one's conduct caused injury to another. This is not a business transaction in which the law
invites reliance for the ordering of affairs. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 361, 157 A.2d 497, 501
(1960).
The court also rejected the argument that to recognize such a right required legislation. "The
law of negligence is primarily common law, whose great virtue is its adaptability to the conditions
and needs of changing times." Id at 362, 157 A.2d at 501. The tort rule denying recovery was
determined by courts and should therefore equally be within courts' province to change. Numer-
ous other courts have shared this belief. E.g., Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208
Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888); Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
Most jurisdictions now allow recovery for injuries occurring at any time after conception. W.
PRossER, supra note 9, § 55, at 337.
For a complete listing of the states still adhering to the viability standard and those that have
abandoned it, see Note, Preconception Infines.: Viable Extension of Prenatal lnjury Law or Incon.
ceivable Tort, 12 VAL. U. L. Rnv. 143, 143-44 n.4 (1977); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971).
57. It is immaterial whether the injury attaches at conception or at birth when it can be
shown that an infant has been born with injuries resulting from the wrongful act of another. See
Smith v. Brennan, 31 NJ. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960).
58. Justice Duckworth foresaw this eventuality in Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Corp.,
212 Ga. 504, 506, 93 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1956) (Duckworth, J., concurring). Reacting to the court's
removal of the viability standard for prenatal injury recovery, he argued: "If a baby can sue for
injuries sustained five seconds after conception ... why not allow such suits for injuries before
conception ... " Id at 506, 93 S.E.2d at 729.
59. See notes 60-74 infra and accompanying text.
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Four years prior to Smith, the United States District Court in New
Jersey dismissed this proposition in Morgan v. United States.6" The
Morgan court held that a child who had not been conceived when its
mother was negligently given an improper blood transfusion had no
right of recovery for injuries resulting from the tortious act. 6 1
The court in Zepeda v. Zepeda62 gave favorable consideration to a
child's cause of action for injuries resulting from a preconception tort
but denied the child's cause of action against her father for her illegiti-
mate conception. The court analogized the situation to one in which an
infant was injured by a defective household device manufactured prior
to the child's conception. In such a case, the court reasoned, the manu-
facturer would have incurred conditional prospective liability63 to any-
one injured by the product, including those not yet in being.64
Nevertheless, the Zepeda court denied the cause of action on public
policy grounds despite admitting that the father had committed a tort
against his child.6 5
No court was squarely faced with this issue again until 1976 in Ren-
60. 143 F. Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1956).
61. Id at 584. The court based its decision on Pennsylvania law. At the time, Berlin v. J.C.
Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940) (no recovery for prenatal injuries), was still control-
hng. Berlin, "a relic harkening back to Victorian antiquarian law and medicine," 19 A.T.L.A.
NEWSLETTER 237 (1976), was disapproved twenty years later in Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267,
164 A.2d 93 (1960).
62. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). This case
involved an adulterine bastard suing his father for damages. Plaintiffs father, married to another
woman, induced plaintiffs mother to have sexual relations on the promise of marriage.
63. Conditional prospective liability involves a duty to one not yet conceived. See note 51
upra.
64. The applicability of product liability law should not be overlooked as a useful tool for
analyzing preconception tort cases. In both product liability and preconception tort cases, the act
of negligence precedes the injury. Many courts allowing recovery for prenatal injury use princi-
ples of product liability to strengthen their reasoning. Eg., Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d
629, 92 P.2d 678, aj-dper curiam. 93 P.2d 562 (1939); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
1960); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C.
227 (County Ct. 1924). See Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1935] All E.R. 209 (reprint):
It may be said that the duty is difficult to define, because when the act of negligence in
manufacture occurs there was no specific person towards whom the duty could be said to
exist: the thing might never be used: it might be destroyed by accident or it might be
scrapped, or in many ways fail to come into use in the normal way: in other words the
duty cannot at the time of manufacture be other than potential or contingent, and only
can become vested by the fact of actual use by a particular person.
Id at 217. Cf. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884) ("a man might
owe a civil duty and incur a conditional prospective liability in tort to one not yet in being").
65. The court did admit that the injurious stigma of being conceived out of wedlock, al-
though not physical, was nevertheless real 41111. App. 2d at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857. Noting the
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slow v. Mennonite Hospital.6 6 In a fact situation virtually identical to
Morgan,67 a sharply divided68 Illinois Supreme Court held that barring
relief for a preconception tort was illogical when the defendant would
be liable if, unbeknown to him, the plaintiff had already been con-
ceived.6 9 Logic and sound policy required the court to find a legal duty
to those yet unconceived. 70 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reiterated this sentiment in Bergstreser v. Mitchell.71
The court noted the overwhelming commentary favoring recognition of
causes of action for prenatal and preconception torts.72  Interpreting
proliferation of claims that would arise if such a cause of action were recognized, however, the
court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.
Cases involving the "wrongful birth" or "wrongful life" cause of action are now being raised
more frequently in the courts. E.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,227 A.2d 689 (1967); Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). It should be noted that courts generally are reluc-
tant to entertain wrongful life cases because to do so would involve creating "a brand new ground
for suit." Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 483, 223 N.E.2d 343, 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887
(1966). For further discussion on this topic, see Proslowe,An Action/or "Wrongful Lfe" 38 N.Y.
U. L. REv. 1078 (1963); Tedeschi, On Tort Liabilityfor "Wrongful Lfe, " 1 ISR.AEL L. Rav. 513
(1966); Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status f a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140
(1976).
66. 67 IML 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
67. InRenslow the plaintifl's mother received an improper blood transfusion eight years prior
to conceiving the infant plaintiff. As a result plaintiff suffered permanent brain damage. Id at
349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
68. The four to three decision had a plurality opinion with three justices filing separate
dissents.
69. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text. The court, however, did not base its con-
clusion on causation but on a duty owed to those foreseeably harmed by the defendant's act, even
though they be unknown or even nonexistent at the time. 67 Mll. 2d at 355-58, 367 N.E.2d at 1254-
55. See notes 10 & 12 supra.
The fear has been expressed that recognition of a cause of action for preconception torts could
lead to perpetual claims when the tort caused a genetic aberration. See Comment, Radiation and
Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 414 (1974); note 74
in ra. The court dismissed this problem by noting that the case at bar did not involve a self-
perpetuating injury. The court did say that if a case arose in which the plaintiff suffered from such
a self-perpetuating injury, a court would "exercise its traditional role of drawing rational distinc-
tions, consonant with current perceptions of justice, between harms which are compensable and
those which are not." 67 Ill. 2d at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
70. 67 IMI. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
71. 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978). In Bergstreser the mother had undergone a Caesarean sec-
tion in Missouri in 1972. Subsequently she conceived the infant plaintiff. Allegedly due to the
first Caesarean section, plaintiff's mother's uterus ruptured prior to delivery. The rupture necessi-
tated a second Caesarean section, during which plaintiff suffered a period of hypoxia and/or an-
oxia. As a result plaintiff now suffers from permanent brain damage.
72. Id at 25 n.4.
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Missouri law,73 the Eighth Circuit affirmed a finding that no logical
reason existed to justify denying recovery to a child plaintiff simply
because the child had not yet been conceived at the time of the tortious
act.74 The court in Albala v. City of New York, however, did not share
this view.75
In A/bala the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held
that an infant plaintiff did not possess the right to recover for injuries
resulting from a tort committed against his mother prior to his concep-
tion.76 Justice Bloom, writing for the court, noted that this was a case
of first impression.77 Looking for guidelines from other cases, the court
quoted extensively from Williams v. State,7" in which the New York
Court of Appeals recognized that a lack of precedent in itself was not
"an unscalable barrier. '79 The A/bala court, however, maintained that
it could not now declare a cause of action where none had ever ex-
isted.80 Citing a number of cases, including Kely v. Gregory,81 the
court contended that previous expansions of tort liability had not rec-
ognized new wrongs but had merely allowed the withdrawal of long
73. This was a diversity case involving a mother, residing in Colorado, and a team of Mis-
souri physicians.
74. 577 F.2d at 26. The court also discussed when the statute of limitations should begin to
run for the infant plaintiff in such a case. It noted that under the Missouri statute an infant
plaintiff injured before the age of 10 had until he was 12 to commence an action. See Mo. REv.
STAT. § 516.105 (1978). The court rejected the argument that the tolling provision for minors
would not apply because the plaintiff was not in esse at the time of the negligent act. It held
instead that the plaintiff was the recipient of the negligent conduct when he came into being, and
that was sufficient to invoke the tolling statute. 577 F.2d at 26.
This ruling appears to coincide with Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), in which the Court
noted that the purpose of the statute of limitations is to force a plaintiff to assert his claim within a
given period of time after he has notice of the injury. Prior to such notice the statute of limitations
should not rim. Id at 169.
One commentator has suggested that a special statute of limitations should be created to handle
claims involving chromosomal aberrations. Steefel, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing The Uncon-
ceived, 48 U. COL. L. REv. 621,627 n.34 (1977). England has passed such a statute, which runs 30
years after the time of irradiation. Nuclear Installations Act, 1965, c. 65, § 14(1).
75. 78 A.D.2d 389, 434 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1981).
76. Id at 392, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
77. Id at 390, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
78. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
79. 78 A.D.2d at 391, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 402. The Court of Appeals is the highest court of
review in New York.
80. Id The court refused to "declare that to be an actionable wrong which the law had
found before to be no wrong at all." Id
81. 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
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acknowledged immunities.8 2
The court analyzed Park v. Chessin, 3 which involved a fact situation
bearing marked similarities to A/bala. 4 Dismissing the wrongful life
denomination given Park by the Court of Appeals, 5 the Albala Court
reduced Park to the rule that a third party cannot recover when dam-
aged by a wrong committed against another.86 Applying this principle
to Albala, the court decided that the appellant had no cause of action
for a tort committed against his mother.87 A contrary decision would
involve creating a new cause of action, a step clearly beyond the
bounds of the judicial process.88
In concluding, the court refused to follow the cases cited by the dis-
sent.8 9 Although Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc.,9"
82. 78 A.D.2d at 391-92, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 402-03. The majority noted that hospitals are no
longer immune from the negligent acts of their employees, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143
N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957), and that manufacturers are now liable for an implied warranty
of merchantability, Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
Furthermore, the removal of exemptions based on gender and infant viability has revealed causes
of action for loss of consortium by a woman, Millington v. Southeastern Elevator, 22 N.Y.2d 498,
239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968), and for prenatal injuries by an infant injured any time
after conception, Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
The court made special note that although the right to damages for psychological injuries was
recognized in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (infant
plaintiff allowed to recover for psychological damages suffered from fright and hysteria during a
fall from a ski lift precipitated by defendant's failure to secure a belt around the plaintiff), such
recovery was limited by Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969) (mother who heard car crash and, upon reaching the accident, saw her child lying on the
ground was denied a cause of action for her own mental injuries), to those injuries not resulting
from a wrong committed against another.
83. 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). TheA/bala court cited the case
as Park v. Chessin. Park was consolidated on appeal with Becker 1. Schwartz, and the case was
styled Becker v. Schwartz in the New York Court of Appeals.
84. In Park, plaintiffs mother had given birth to a child with polycystic kidney disease. The
child died five hours later. After her doctor incorrectly told her that the chances that future chil-
dren would have the disease were "practically nil," she conceived the plaintiff, who was born with
the same disease and died two and one-half years later. The infant plaintiff, through its parents.
brought suit for pain and suffering incurred prior to its death. Albala v. City of New York, 78
A.D.2d at 392, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
85. The New York Court of Appeals, in modifying a lower court decision, Park v. Chessin,
88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), dismissed the suit for wrongful life inasmuch
as it failed to allege ascertainable damages. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411-12, 386
N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978).
86. 78 A.D.2d at 392, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
87. Id
88. The court qualified its holding as subject to instructions from "superior judicial authority
or by the Legislature." Id
89. See notes 90-93 infra and accompanying text.
90. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). This case involved a woman who suffered genetic aberra-
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Bergstreser v. Mitchell,9 and Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital9 2 all recog-
nized an infant's right to recover for injuries resulting from a precon-
ception tort, the Albala court summarily dismissed each of them. The
majority noted that Jorgensen and Bergstreser were based on the specu-
lation of federal courts as to how the respective state courts would have
decided the issue;93 that Renslow was written by a sharply divided
court;94 and that Renslow and Bergstreser both were influenced 9 by
Park i'. Chessin,96 a lower court decision, subsequently dismissed by
the New York Court of Appeals.97
Justice Carro, dissenting,98 argued for the extension of the prenatal
injury doctrine to preconception torts.99 He noted that all recent cases
involving such actions allowed recovery.1 ° In puncturing the mother's
uterus, the defendants breached their duty of care to both the mother
and those who foreseeably would be harmed in the future. 01 He
tions in the chromosomal structure of her ovum that allegedly were caused by birth control pills
manufactured by the out-of-state defendant. As a result of these aberrations, plaintiffs' twins suf-
fered from Asiatic Mongolism. The court, in recognizing the plaintiffs' right of recovery, reasoned
that if an infant could not recover for a preconception tort, "then an infant suffering personal
injury from a defective food product, manufactured before his conception, would be without rem-
edy." Id at 240. See note 64 supra.
91. 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978). See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
92. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). See notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text.
93. Both were diversity cases. See notes 73 & 90 supra.
94. See note 68 supra.
95. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 356, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (1976), cited
Park as a case recognizing a cause of action for a preconception tort but faulted the Park court's
reliance on causation rather than the traditional duty concept as a basis for its decision. Berg-
streser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978), cited Park as one of three cases addressing the
preconception tort issue, all of which recognized the child's cause of action.
96. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), modfied, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
97. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
98. 78 A.D.2d at 393, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 403 (Carro, J., dissenting).
99. Id at 396-97, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 405-06 (Carro, J., dissenting).
100. Justice Carro referred to the following cases: Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories,
Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973), see note 90 supra and accompanying text; Bergstreser v. Mitch-
ell, 448 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Mo. 1977), affd, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978), see notes 71-75 supra and
accompanying text; Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977), see
notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text. Albala v. City of New York, 78 A.D.2d at 394-95, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 404-05 (Carro, J., dissenting).
101. In comparing the case at bar with other cases involving preconception torts, see note 100
supra and accompanying text, Justice Carro stated:
[.Abala] is simpler and more direct than any of the cases in which a right of recovery has
thus far been upheld. The defendants violated their duty of care to plaintifi's mother
and negligently punctured her uterus. It was foreseeable that she, a young married wo-
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pointed out the inconsistency involved in granting recovery for an act
committed one moment after conception while denying it for an act
committed the second before.10 2
Citing the court's analysis in Zepeda,103 Justice Carro concluded that
little difference existed between the case at bar and the hypothetical
example of an infant injured by a product negligently manufactured
prior to the child's conception.'"
The /bala case is an example of an attempt to rationalize a miscon-
ception of justice. In contrast to other courts considering the precon-
ception tort issue,'0 5 the court in Albala failed to analyze the duty
concept 0 6 and the progressive attitude of recent courts in compensating
infant plaintiffs for injuries caused by torts committed prior to their
birth. 10 7
The court apparently based its conservative decision on the premise
that a court should not recognize a cause of action where none had
previously existed. 0 8 Although this principle is reasonable in some sit-
uations, 0 9 its application in this case is dubious." 0 A/bala did not in-
volve circumstances in which the stability of the law affects people's
man, would again conceive. She did, and plaintiff was bom brain damaged as a result.
To afford relief is consistent with common law principles.
78 A.D.2d at 396-97, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Carro, J., dissenting).
102. 78 A.D.2d at 397, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Carro, J., dissenting).
103. 41 Ill. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). See notes 62-
64 supra and accompanying text.
104. 78 A.D.2d at 396, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Carro, J., dissenting).
105. See notes 90-92 supra.
106. Arguably, the court, in dismissing the suit, by implication found no duty. This, however,
is a very unsatisfactory explanation.
107. In Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 M11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
945 (1964), the court noted:'
[Tihe present course of the law [is moving toward] permitting actions for physical injury
ever closer to the moment of conception.... The significance of this course is this: if
recovery is to be permitted an infant injured one month after conception, why not if
injured one week after, one minute after, or at the moment of conception? It is inevita-
ble that the date will be further retrogressed.
Id at 249, 190 N.E.2d at 853. See notes 90-92 supra.
108. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
109. For example, the principle is reasonable in a business transaction in which the law invites
reliance to order one's affairs. See note 56 supra.
110. Surely the majority does not mean to insinuate that conduct resulting in injury to a fetus
or new born infant is not a wrong, yet, this appears to be the logical conclusion of the majority's
argument. The fact that the defendant does not have a duty to the plaintiff may result in a non-
actionable wrong, see note 14 supra and accompanying text, but this does not make the conduct
any more desirable. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
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behavior"' but, rather, simply involved negligent conduct resulting in
injuries to others." 2 Courts should not allow defendants in situations
such as A/bala to mask their tortfeasance behind poorly reasoned,
archaic precedent."t 3 Justice Carro's dissent is persuasive on this point.
Justice Carro's dissent implies that if a person's negligent act is incor-
porated into an object or another person, the actor should be responsi-
ble to those subsequently injured as a result of his negligence. 4 The
Albala defendants breached the duty of care befitting their profession
in performing the abortion procedure on the plaintifi's mother."t 5 The
defendants were in essence "preparing" the mother's uterus to carry
any children she might subsequently conceive." 6 By puncturing her
uterus, the physicians, like the manufacturer who negligently produced
a household appliance, breached a duty to the class of individuals
foreseeably affected by the negligent act." 7 The question of whether
an act is any less wrong because certain members of that class were
individually unknown or not in esse at the time of the act has been
definitively answered by courts and commentators, with the exception
of41bala, in the negative." 8
The majority's application of Park v. Chessin " is misguided. In
Park, as in other wrongful life cases,'2 ° the plaintiffs' alleged injury
was life itself.'2' The analogy by the court of a wrongful life case to
one such as41bala, in which the defendant's acts are directly responsi-
I 11. See note 56 supra.
112. See 78 A.D.2d at 394, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 404 (Carro, J., dissenting).
113. See note 56 supra.
114. Justice Carro relied heavily on the analogy between a preconception tort resulting in
injury to an infant and an item manufactured prior to an infant's conception that results in the
same. 78 A.D.2d at 398, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 406 (Carro, J., dissenting). See notes 63-64 & 103-104
supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 5 & I Isupra.
116. It is not uncommon for women to abort a defective fetus with the hope of later bearing a
healthy child. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (wrongful life suit in
which mother contended that but for the doctor's statement that her child would not be affected by
her contraction of German measles she would have aborted the plaintiff).
117. See note 10 supra; notes 63-70 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 62-74 & 90 supra and accompanying text.
119. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). See notes 83-88 supra and
accompanying text.
120. Most wrongful life cases argue that but for the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff would
not have been born. See note 65 supra.
121. But for the defendant's incorrect advice, plaintiff would not be alive. See note 84 supra.
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ble for the infant plaintiffs injuries, clearly lacks logic. 122 Further-
more, by reducing Park to the principle that "a wrong committed
against one which results in damage to another is not actionable by the
other" 123 the court contradicts Park's dismissal of the infant's com-
plaints on the basis that they failed to allege ascertainable damages1 24
and not that the damages resulted from an unactionable wrong com-
mitted against another.
Courts should continue to increase their receptivity to infant plain-
tiffs' demands to be compensated for injuries resulting from defend-
ants' negligent acts. 125 Additionally, courts should ignore cases such as
Albala that represent an outmoded judicial approach 26 and unnecessa-
rily produce an unjust result.
B.A.R.
122. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). The Gleluman court observed
that the infant plaintiff would have to argue
not that he should have been born without defects but that he should not have been born
at all. In the language of tort law he says: but for the negligence of defendants, he
would not have been born to suffer with an impaired body. In other words, he claims
that the conduct of defendants prevented his mother from obtaining an abortion which
would have terminated his existence, and that his very life is "wrongful."
Id at 28, 227 A.2d at 692. The court noted that it could not "weigh the value of life with impair-
ments against the nonexistence of life itself. By asserting that he should not have been born, the
infant plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages because of
the impossibility of making the comparison required by compensatory remedies." Id at 28, 227
A.2d at 692.
If it were not for life itself, the infant plaintiff would not exist. The plaintiffs cause of action
undercuts the very ground on which he needs to rely in order to prove his damages. Tedeschi,
smpra note 65, at 519.
123. 78 A.D.2d at 392, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
124. Park v. Chessin, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411-12, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900
(1978).
125. Less than 40 years ago, courts would not recognize a cause of action for injuries resulting
from tortious conduct committed prior to the plaintiffs birth. See notes 17-38 supra and accom-
panying text. In most jurisdictions a cause of action is now recognized for injuries caused any
time after conception, see notes 39-56 supra and accompanying text, and, in at least three jurisdic-
tions, a cause of action is allowed for damages caused by wrongful acts committed prior to the
plaintiffs conception, see notes 66-74 & 90 supra and accompanying text.
126. Analogous to this suggestion, Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940),
was disapproved because of its outmoded approach. See note 61 supra.
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